One way to understand the Brexit result, in which the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union, is to study which areas of the UK supported “Leave” and which supported “Remain.” YouGov, for example, provided this analysis and map before last week’s voting showing how support varied across the UK.

(YouGov)

I wanted to go deeper to explain this variation. Each local authority in the UK reported the percentages received by Remain and Leave. I gathered the percentage that voted for Leave, which is my dependent variable.

If the anti-immigration, anti-establishment arguments had a greater effect on eventual referendum outcome, then past support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP) or UKIP-friendly demographics should have had more substantive effect on the Leave vote than support for the more traditionally Euroskeptic Conservative Party.

To show the effect of UKIP’s anti-immigration appeals on the eventual Leave vote, I use two measures of support for UKIP: the vote share for UKIP in the most recent local authority election and the UKIP Demographic Favorability Index created by Matthew Goodwin and Caitlin Milazzo (the creation of their index is described in detail in appendix B of their book). The index ranges from 0 to 1 and is based on each local authority’s socioeconomic constitution. Higher values indicate greater potential support for UKIP1.

I also include the Conservative and Labour parties’ share of the vote in the last council election, and a term interacting Labour support with the UKIP index. I restrict the analysis to English local authorities only, and include a dummy variable representing each of the London boroughs. The results are reproduced below, with the dependent variable the vote percentage obtained by Leave in the local authority.

Analysis of Brexit vote using STATA. Coefficients show the effect of a one-unit increase in each variable on the percentage of each district voting Leave. (David Parker)

The UKIP index, Conservative vote share, and UKIP vote share variables are all significant and positive predictors of a vote to leave the European Union. Importantly, the UKIP Demographic Favorability Index has the most substantive effect on increasing the Leave vote, while the percentage of the vote obtained by UKIP in the most recent council election has the second largest effect — an effect almost double the effect of the conservative vote share coefficient.

Support for UKIP — a proxy for anti-establishment, populist, and anti-immigration support — does a far better job predicting Leave than does local authority support for the Tories. If this referendum were about traditional Euroskepticism, then one might expect the relationship between Conservative Party vote share and the Leave vote to be much stronger than the relationship between the Leave vote and measures of UKIP support.

But the most fascinating finding is actually the interactive relationship between the UKIP index and the Labour share of local authority vote in the last election. The Labour vote share variable is significant and negative, but the interaction term is significant and positively signed. This essentially means that UKIP-friendly demographics provided Leave with an extra push in areas that have supported Labour in past council elections.

Put another way, the arguments made by UKIP were more effectively deployed in Labour-areas that were older, whiter, less educated, and with higher levels of constituents employed in blue-collar occupations.

The Leave campaign benefited from the groundwork laid by UKIP over the past several election cycles in local council elections — increasingly, elections won at the expense of Labour. Moving from a 91 UKIP index constituency with a Labour local council vote share of 53 to 12 percent reduced the predicted vote for leave by nearly 2 percentage points. Without support from traditional Labour areas, the Leave campaign could not have won — and it was the emotionally charged arguments employed by UKIP over repeated elections that seem to have made the difference.

Classically, UKIP took an issue neither party has addressed effectively — immigration — and used it to build a substantial third-party challenge. In the 2015 general election, UKIP supplanted the Europhilic Liberal Democrats as the United Kingdom’s third-largest party. The UKIP challenge may, in time, reorder considerably the British party system and the 300-plus union itself.

The analysis shown here suggests that the Brexit results were about much more than Euroskepticism as usual. Brexit was an anti-establishment, populist, and national convulsion against the forces of globalization. These are exactly the forces Donald Trump has marshaled to, against everyone’s expectations, capture the Republican nomination. And, to a lesser degree, it is the anti-establishment, left-behind voters to whom Bernie Sanders appealed during his campaign for the Democratic nomination.

Fearmongering, not rational discourse about a democratic deficit, propelled the UK out of the EU. And it is exactly the same that could thrust Donald Trump into the White House.

David C. Parker is an associate professor of political science at Montana State University. He is the author of Battle for the Big Sky: Representation and the Politics of Place in the Race for the U.S. Senate and The Power of Money in Congressional Campaigns, 1880-2006.

This post is part of Mischiefs of Faction, an independent political science blog featuring reflections on the party system. See more Mischiefs of Faction posts here.

In a recent blog post, Jacqueline Gehring argued that all the hand waving about “Brexit,” the UK’s decision whether to leave the European Union, and an imminent Trump victory were, at best, overblown. She claims that Great Britain has always been wary of its relationship to Europe and the EU, and public support for a Brexit has always been strong.

Recent concerns about terrorism and immigration had little to do with rising xenophobia or populism, she continues, which means the event ultimately speaks not at all to the current American political scene and the possibility of a Trump presidency.

I respectfully disagree with my right honorable colleague. Britain’s “Leave” vote may have been the result of long-simmering Euroskepticism, but without the rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and its anti-immigration rhetoric, I’m doubtful Leave would have won. In fact, the successful rise of UKIP in the 2015 general election and its ability to jettison the United Kingdom from the EU speaks directly to why Democrats ought to seriously worry about their electoral prospects in the fall.

Let me be clear: I am a student of Congress and American politics. I have a keen interest in British politics, and I teach a study abroad course on it, but I would not call myself an expert. Still, I am familiar with the work of Matthew Goodwin, who has co-authored two books on right-wing politics in the UK (Revolt on the Right and UKIP) — focusing primarily on the rise of UKIP, which is led by Nigel Farage. I recommend both wholeheartedly.

Goodwin and his co-authors make three key claims in both books. First, UKIP supporters are all Euroskeptics, but not all Euroskeptics are UKIP supporters. In fact, Goodwin et al. write, UKIP’s growth has been fueled by combining Euroskepticism with “potent appeals on domestic issues.”

They continue:

The “left behind” voters flocking to UKIP are angry about immigration and the failure of the mainstream parties to manage it, and alienated by a political class which they feel does not listen to them, and has done nothing to make their lives better.

Conservative opponents of the EU have always stressed that their quarrel with the EU stemmed from sovereignty rapidly slipping away from Westminster, as well as the overly burdensome regulations imposed by unelected Brussels bureaucrats. UKIP’s arguments against the EU encompassed that and more. The party’s criticisms have been far more visceral and emotional: that the EU represented an attack on the Englishness itself.

A second claim made by Goodwin and his co-authors is that UKIP increasingly saw its growth potential not among disaffected Tories but among disaffected Labour voters. Goodwin and Caitlin Milazzo write in UKIP that “Labour voters had actually been moving away from the party since the 1990s, ever since it had joined the so-called liberal consensus on Europe and immigration.”

They continue, “This loss of faith and the erosion of the left’s traditional base would soon provide an opening for Farage, leaving a reservoir of disgruntled people who had once voted for Labour.” To grab Labour voters required an appeal beyond Euroskepticism.

Finally, Goodwin documents in public opinion polls both the rise of immigration as the most important issue facing Britain and the perceived inability of the Conservatives or Labour to do anything about it. As Gehring argues, support for Brexit does not seem to ebb and flow with opinions on terrorism or immigration in public opinion polls. More important is the critical mass of voters who feel powerless, looking for a mechanism to voice their displeasure to both the major parties. That vehicle was the referendum on EU membership — a vehicle provided by Prime Minister David Cameron and happily exploited by UKIP.

UKIP has long been castigated for its questionable electioneering tactics, particularly when it came to its billboards and posters. Here is a UKIP poster from the 2014 European Parliament elections:

UKIP campaign poster for May 2014 elections. (UKIP)

Here is another, employed by the Leave campaign in the lead-up to the Brexit vote:

UK Independence Party leader Nigel Farage poses in front of UKIP’s “Breaking Point” ad for the Leave campaign. (Jack Taylor/Getty Images)

Both make emotional and visceral arguments about immigration — quite different from the traditional conservative arguments focused on the growth of a European superstate or the EU’s democratic deficit. Put simply, the arguments made against Europe by UKIP and the Tories were different — and I claim that UKIP’s emotionally charged argument was essential to Leave winning the campaign.

And, importantly, UKIP has been making exactly these arguments against the EU for some time — not just during the referendum campaign.

David C. Parker is an associate professor of political science at Montana State University. He is the author of Battle for the Big Sky: Representation and the Politics of Place in the Race for the U.S. Senate and The Power of Money in Congressional Campaigns, 1880-2006.

This post is part of Mischiefs of Faction, an independent political science blog featuring reflections on the party system. See more Mischiefs of Faction posts here.