Now that the midterm elections are behind them, several members of Congress have thrown their hats in the ring to run for party leadership posts. Most of the attention has been given to the election for speaker of the House, which current Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi appears likely to win, though she faces some resistance within her own party. 

Other party leadership positions are being contested too, however. Republicans will be selecting their top leader, a contest between Republicans Kevin McCarthy (CA) and Jim Jordan (OH). Democrats, meanwhile, are facing elections for five posts: majority whip, assistant leader, Democratic Caucus chair and vice chair, and chair of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee.

Elections to these positions, especially the lower-level ones, seldom get much attention. But they can be quite significant. Those who win acquire a wider public platform and can influence the policy direction and electoral success of their party. 

The winners are also likely to move further up the leadership ladder, thereby gaining more influence and public attention. For instance, Tom DeLay was elected Republican conference secretary in 1992, later becoming one of the most effective majority whips and floor leaders in the modern Congress. Incoming Majority Leader Steny Hoyer had previously won a contested race for caucus chair in 1989, while Assistant Leader James Clyburn got his start by winning an election for caucus vice chair in 2002.  

Each of this year’s contested leadership elections features different candidates, issues, and campaign tactics. But despite these differences, our research suggests a few common rules of thumb for gaming the outcome.

Money matters

Depending on the race, many variables may enter into legislators’ calculations of whom to support for a leadership office. They include ideology, seniority, shared state delegation or committee, and if a legislator serves in leadership. 

One variable, however, is consistently important: campaign contributions. When two or more candidates run for a party leadership office, donations from leadership candidates to their colleagues are a statistically significant explanation of vote choice. 

Assuming that money influences these upcoming contests, certain candidates already have a crucial advantage over their rivals. For instance, Kevin McCarthy has far outspent Jim Jordan: His leadership political action committee (LPAC) gave more than $2 million to more than 200 Republican incumbents and candidates through the end of September, whereas Jordan did not even have an LPAC in this election cycle. 

Katherine Clark (MA), running for caucus vice chair, donated $120,000 to more than 90 Democratic incumbents and challengers, while the LPAC of her rival, Pete Aguilar (CA), gave just $16,000 to 15 House incumbents and first-time candidates. (While this suggests that Clark has an advantage over Aguilar, the data excludes non-LPAC contributions and donations made after September, which may yield a different picture of fundraising by both candidates.)

Campaign contributions have also been a potent factor in Pelosi’s bid for the speakership. Besides the fact that Pelosi chalked up some major legislative wins during her last stint as speaker, her fundraising prowess has served as a persuasive argument among Democrats that she should be elevated to the position.

Freshmen can be an influential bloc

Many of the candidates in these contested leadership elections have been cultivating votes from their incumbent colleagues for months. But when many new legislators are elected to Congress, those newbies may help swing a leadership election one way or another.

The midterm elections will bring at least 50 new lawmakers to the House Democratic Caucus, giving them an outsize role in the outcome of leadership races. Also worth noting is that many of them are women or ethnic minorities. Because gender and ethnicity can be statistically significant predictors of vote choice in leadership elections, their votes may give a leg-up to nonwhite and women candidates for leadership posts — candidates like Ben Ray Luján (NM), who is running for assistant leader against David Cicilline (RI).

Surprises do happen

Much of the variation in vote choice cannot be explained by measurable variables. Personal relationships, behind-the-scenes deals, and other factors may help one candidate win over her rivals, which means there is always the potential for an unexpected outcome. Tom Cole (R-OK) and John Larson (D-CT) are among those who chalked up surprise wins in their races for leadership posts in recent years.

Perhaps the most famous example of how a candidate’s personality and personal relationships can cost him votes was the 1976 election for House majority leader. Phil Burton (D-CA) was considered the frontrunner over the other three Democratic candidates, but his heavy drinking, erratic personality, and aggressive ambition had alienated many of his colleagues. He maintained a solid lead in two rounds of balloting before losing on the last ballot by a single vote. The unexpected winner, Jim Wright (D-CA), would go on to become a powerful and controversial speaker of the House.

Finally, history suggests that it is wise to keep one’s eye on both the winners and the losers of these races. While the victors may continue illustrious careers in leadership, the losers do not necessarily disappear from view. Dennis Hastert (R-IL), for instance, came in last place in a contest for majority leader in November 1998. Less than two months later, after both Speaker Newt Gingrich and Gingrich’s likely successor, Bob Livingston (R-LA), had resigned from Congress, Hastert was sworn in as the next speaker of the House.

Even those who cannot fulfill their aspirations for leadership in Congress may pursue successful careers elsewhere. When John Boehner (R-POH) was reelected minority leader in November 2006, he trounced his opponent, 168 to 27. Boehner would later rise to the speakership before resigning in October 2015. Meanwhile, his opponent left Congress, got elected as governor of his home state and, in 2017, acquired a new title: Vice President Mike Pence.

Matthew Green is a professor of politics at Catholic University. Douglas Harris is a professor of political science at Loyola University Maryland. They are the authors of the forthcoming book Choosing the Leader: Leadership Elections in the U.S. House of Representatives.

Update 11/13: Updated to clarify the fundraising totals mentioned for Katherine Clark and Pete Aguilar.

Commentators have wondered why some House Democrats seem eager to oust Nancy Pelosi as the leader of their party. They rightly note that she is a tireless campaigner, has raised huge amounts of campaign money, and has an impressive track record as a legislative leader. Wouldn’t it hurt the party to replace such a successful leader, and a woman leader at that?

Many congressional Democrats — probably a majority — would say yes. But those who would not have understandable reasons for seeking a replacement. In fact, their grievances are rooted in two central goals of lawmakers: winning election and exercising influence in the legislature. How Pelosi’s leadership intersects with those goals helps explain anti-Pelosi sentiment among certain members of her party, and why many Democratic candidates are noncommittal about supporting her as leader.

Goal 1: (Re)election

The first grievance is rooted in perhaps the single most important desire of incumbents and would-be legislators: to be elected. Party leaders are expected to help, not hurt, their party’s chances of winning and keeping majorities in Congress. But while Pelosi is a lucrative fundraiser and a relentless advocate for her party, House Democrats have a poor track record of winning majorities under her leadership. 

Of the 16 years that Pelosi has served as the top leader of House Democrats, the party has been in the majority for just four years. Worse, she was speaker of the House when Democrats lost their majority in 2010 — a 63-seat loss that was the largest suffered by the party in more than seven decades. While many have compared Pelosi to Speaker Sam Rayburn, the long-serving Democratic speaker in the mid-20th century, a better analogy may be Joe Martin, a Massachusetts Republican who was speaker just twice during his two decades leading the House GOP.

Pelosi’s critics have argued that her reputation as an outspoken liberal and legislative activist has hindered Democrats’ ability to win swing districts. A strong case can be made that other factors are more at fault — such as gerrymandering, the quality of Democratic challengers, and President Obama’s approval ratings — but that is unlikely to assuage the frustrations of legislators stuck in the minority. As I have written elsewhere, being in the minority can be a deeply discouraging experience for members of the House, and it is not uncommon for them to blame their status on party leaders.

This year, Pelosi’s impact on the election of Democrats has been made especially salient by Republicans running an enormous number of attack ads tying her to Democratic candidates. There’s no sign that the ads are having the desired effect, but it’s also reasonable that many of those Democrats are trying to nullify those attacks by distancing themselves from Pelosi. This in turn serves as further evidence for her critics that she is not helpful to the party’s electoral chances.

Goal 2: more influence

There is a second reason that some Democrats are unhappy with Pelosi: a lack of opportunities in their caucus. Pelosi and Minority Whip Steny Hoyer have held the same top two posts for more than a dozen years, clogging the upper rungs of the leadership ladder. It’s the longest time that the same two individuals have occupied the highest positions in the caucus since the 1950s, when power was far less concentrated within leadership. 

In addition, Pelosi has a well-earned reputation for rewarding her friends and punishing her enemies. I have previously argued that Pelosi’s propensity to enforce personal loyalty might help her consolidate power in the caucus, but it could also breed discontent among those whom she disfavored, especially if they are denied opportunities for influence.

This discontent is felt mostly by incumbents. But Pelosi’s long tenure has also led some younger candidates in largely Democratic districts, seeing Pelosi as emblematic of the party’s old guard, to refrain from endorsing her. In April, for instance, the eventual Democratic nominee for the Third District of Massachusetts, Lori Trahan, complained that there was no clear plan to determine Pelosi’s successor; she still will not commit to voting for her as leader. Other new candidates in Democratic districts who will not unequivocally endorse Pelosi include Jahana Hayes (CT), Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (NY), and Rashida Tlaib (MI). 

Pelosi has the upper hand … for now

Despite these pockets of resistance, Pelosi seems to have the upper hand.  For one thing, no one has officially declared their candidacy for leader, leaving her unopposed. She has also contributed money to many candidates for Congress, helping solidify their support. Also, while scores of Democratic candidates have not endorsed her for leader, most have not promised explicitly to vote against her, and it’s unclear how many will get elected in the first place. 

Meanwhile, within the House Caucus, opposition to Pelosi appears to be deep but not broad. A quixotic proposal from her opponents to change the party’s rules, increasing the vote threshold for leader, suggested that they did not represent the majority of the caucus. It was endorsed by fewer than a dozen Democrats.

Pelosi’s position may be further strengthened if Democrats do well in the upcoming elections, as Jonathan Bernstein has argued. But Doug Harris and I note in our forthcoming study of congressional leadership races that a key mediating factor is lawmakers’ expectations for an election. If the party wins the majority but by a narrower-than-expected margin, many more Democrats may be convinced that she harms their chances of winning at the polls. 

To be sure, Pelosi may take credit for a larger Democratic wave. But why would her opponents accept that at face value if she is not also to be held responsible for past electoral losses? They are more likely to suspect that they are being “rain made.”

In fact, Pelosi has taken several steps that suggest her position within the party is not as strong as it once was. She has made several concessions to her critics, delaying leadership elections until December and implying that her tenure is coming to an end (though perhaps not until a Democrat is elected president). And it should be noted that while she won her last contested election for leader, in 2016, a third of the caucus voted for her opponent — the largest since she was first elected to a leadership post in 2002.

In the short run, the safe bet is on Pelosi remaining her party’s leader in the next Congress, and perhaps even becoming speaker again. But until she can convince discontented Democrats that she will help, not hurt, their efforts to win elections and exercise influence, she will continue to face resistance within her party — and the danger that, eventually, she will face a challenger who can marshal enough votes to defeat her.

Matthew Green is a professor of political science at Catholic University.

Why did John Boehner decide to resign his speakership? Most accounts have pointed the finger at his party in the House. Divided over tactics if not over policy goals, the House Republican Conference contains a core group of dissenters that were willing to openly challenge Boehner’s authority in ways that, until recently, were considered apostasy in Congress. It seems hard to imagine that anyone could survive as leader of a party as fractured as Boehner’s.

But the relationship between a party and its leaders is not unidirectional. And as challenging as it may be to govern the House GOP right now, it’s also worth considering what role Boehner may have played in his own political demise.

In his 1961 article “Political Leadership and the Problem of Charismatic Power,” political theorist Carl Friedrich wrote about the origins and use of power by political leaders. Power, he argued, is both something a leader possesses and a result of her relationship with her followers. Though leaders in democratic institutions depend mostly on relationships for their power — since the followers get to choose their leaders — power is also something they possess and exercise independently. These two sources of power, which Friedrich termed consent and coercion, are not mutually exclusive.

The factions within the House Republican Party have been well-documented, as has the open opposition to Boehner’s speakership expressed by some members of the party, which has made it hard for Boehner to exercise power. There have been hints, however, that Boehner’s choice of when and how to exercise power and authority may have encouraged intraparty rebellion. And it may not fit well with how Congress has been since at least the mid-1990s, when Newt Gingrich was speaker: ideological, uncompromising, highly partisan, and caught up in the never-ending news cycle.

For instance, in mid-2013 reporter Paul Kane noted that neither Boehner nor his fellow leaders (then-Majority Leader Eric Cantor and then-Whip Kevin McCarthy) preferred to push aggressively for votes. “To veteran Republicans and former lawmakers,” he wrote, “the three were too tolerant of the younger generation from the outset.” In another article from 2013, Noah Bierman wrote that Boehner’s critics felt more “pity” than anger toward the speaker. Leaders who are pitied are not likely to have the personal authority necessary to exercise power.

When rebels have been sanctioned, the punishments have often been halfhearted and poorly executed. Four Republicans were kicked off committees after the 2012 elections and just a few weeks before the next Congress met to choose its speaker; three of them then refused to cast ballots for Boehner, helping make the vote closer than it might have been. Earlier this year Rep. Mark Meadows was removed as a subcommittee chair, a move that was rescinded a week later, emboldening GOP conservatives. Meadows subsequently introduced a resolution to declare the speakership vacant, generating months of media speculation about Boehner’s future.

Boehner’s more relaxed, conciliatory style of leadership works well in a legislature where cross-party voting is acceptable, disagreements aren’t taken personally, legislative activity is often hidden from the public, and backroom deals are a part of governing. Such was the House of Representatives of the mid-20th century, when the legendary Sam Rayburn of Texas served as speaker. Majority Democrats under Rayburn were deeply divided between Southern conservatives and Northern liberals, but Rayburn managed to make the House work through a combination of building cross-party coalitions and, when possible, steering clear of divisive issues (like civil rights) altogether. Open punishments for dissent were rare.

Boehner’s difficult tenure as speaker should thus serve as a cautionary tale for his successor. Congressional parties cannot be commanded, and there will always be lawmakers who refuse to go along with their leaders. But at a minimum, for Congress to work well its leaders must develop and protect their personal reservoir of power and use it in a manner that best fits the party and chamber they are trying to lead. To do so will be one of the biggest challenges facing the next speaker of the House.

Matthew Green is an associate professor of politics at the Catholic University of America in Washington, DC. His book Underdog Politics: The Minority Party in the U.S. House of Representatives was published in January by Yale University Press.

In the House of Representatives, the majority party holds most of the cards. It gets to write the chamber’s rules, it has the votes to pick the speaker of the House, it decides which bills come to the floor (and which ones don’t), and it determines how those bills are debated. That’s why it’s often a frustrating and demoralizing ordeal for a representative to be stuck in the minority.

As I document in my recent book, however, the majority doesn’t possess the entire deck. In fact, the minority party in the House has repeatedly, and often significantly, exercised influence. Policies as broad-reaching as the BRAC process for closing military bases to practices as minor as the House’s daily recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance owe their authorship to members of the minority party.

This past year in particular, the House’s Democratic minority has exerted itself quite effectively. In June, Democrats temporarily derailed a measure to create a “fast track” process for approving trade agreements. A month later, Republicans pulled the Interior-EPA spending bill from the House floor after Democrats vociferously objected to an effort to undo a newly added ban on the Confederate flag at federal cemeteries. More recently, Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi assiduously built a big enough coalition of Democrats in favor of the Iran nuclear agreement that Republicans would be unable to override a veto against a resolution disapproving the agreement. The GOP instead reverted to an elaborate “triple-vote” tactic that was largely symbolic.

There are two major reasons the House minority party has been sitting pretty since the 2014 elections. First, Democrats are more unified than Republicans. That matters because if Republican leaders can’t get enough of their troops in line to pass bills, those bills fail without Democratic votes. And that gives the minority party leverage.

Look, for instance, at aggregate voting patterns. Since 1995, the majority party in the House has always had a higher voting unity score than the minority. (A party’s voting unity score is the average percentage of the time its members cast their ballots with their party whenever the two parties are on opposite sides of a vote.) But in recent years, the scores of minority party Democrats have been climbing. In fact, as of mid-September the Democrats’ score for 2015 was actually a smidgeon greater than the Republicans’ (91.9 percent versus 91.8 percent).

But party unity scores conceal the deeper divisions within the Republican Party. The GOP’s biggest dissenters have organized into the House Freedom Caucus (HFC), which has enough members (40 or so) to combine with a unified minority party to kill Republican bills they deem insufficiently conservative. That they are organized is critical: Though HFC members tend to be more conservative than their House colleagues, their average party unity score to date is actually higher (92.6 percent) than the GOP average. However, when they oppose bills as a bloc, the HFC represents a pivotal faction that can defeat those bills if Democrats vote against them too. This constrains the majority party’s power to set the legislative agenda, as Rep. Tom McClintock (R-CA) pointed out in his letter of resignation from the HFC on September 16.

House Democrats have been in an advantageous position this year because their party has less to lose should Congress fail to legislate

Now, with a government shutdown looming, the HFC has flexed its muscles, insisting that its members will not vote for any spending bill that fails to defund Planned Parenthood. Coupled with the threat from a handful of conservatives to remove Boehner as speaker (however unlikely that may be), this move puts significant pressure on Boehner to pass a spending bill the HFC wants, even if it will almost certainly be vetoed by Obama or blocked in the Senate. Boehner’s alternative is to turn to the minority party, which has insisted it won’t vote for any bill to fund the government unless Republicans agree to negotiate an increase in nonmilitary as well as military spending.

The other reason House Democrats have been in an advantageous position this year, and are in one now, is that their party has less to lose should Congress fail to legislate. Obama is a lame duck president, so he doesn’t have to face voters who would be upset by a government shutdown. It also means House Democrats are less worried that their actions might hurt the president politically, as evidenced by their earlier willingness to buck Obama and vote against the trade bill the president wanted.

Meanwhile, because Democrats lost their majority in the Senate last November, it is more likely to be Senate Republicans, not Democrats, who are blamed for bad outcomes like a government shutdown. Thus Pelosi feels no pressure to protect the party’s majority in the Senate (as she did two years ago, during the last shutdown) and has more leeway in pushing for tough demands in negotiations with the GOP.

It’s not certain, of course, that House Democrats will be able to use their political leverage in the current showdown over government funding. If, for instance, there is a lengthy and painful shutdown, the party may eventually feel enough political pressure from constituents and others to vote for an appropriations bill with less domestic spending than they’ve demanded. And the power of House Democrats is augmented significantly by cooperation from Senate Democrats and the White House. Though Obama, Reid, and Pelosi stand together for now in demanding more spending in whatever funding bill comes from Congress, there’s no guarantee that cooperation will continue. In fact, one longtime budget expert doesn’t think congressional Democrats will be a part of negotiations over government spending at all.

Nonetheless, the circumstances throughout this year have been quite favorable to House Democrats. It’s a reminder that no matter how majoritarian the House of Representatives may be, there is always the chance that the minority may matter.

Matthew Green is an associate professor of politics at the Catholic University of America in Washington, DC. His book Underdog Politics: The Minority Party in the U.S. House of Representatives was published in January by Yale University Press.