Michael Krepon | Vox

The Hiroshima anniversary: 5 things you should know about nuclear weapons today

2018-08-06T10:44:30-04:00

Visitors lays flowers and pray for the atomic bomb victims at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park in Hiroshima, August 6, 2018. | Richard Atrero de Guzman/NUR Photo

The imprint on public consciousness of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, which occurred 73 years ago Monday, has faded greatly. The hibakusha, or survivors of the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, which killed more than 130,000 and left tens of thousands of others with horrendous injuries, have been the most ardent proponents of nuclear abolition. Now they are few in number, and nuclear-armed states seem deaf to their pleas.

This anniversary arrives at a time when the “nuclear enterprise” in the United States is gearing up to spend more than $1 trillion on new missiles, bombers, and submarines over the next three decades.

Meanwhile, the competing “arms control enterprise” is unraveling: There are at present no negotiations underway to reduce US and Russian nuclear forces, while China, Pakistan, India, and North Korea are increasing theirs. Yet at the same time, the situation isn’t completely bleak. Here are five key points to keep in mind about nuclear weapons on this somber anniversary:

1) The taboo against using nuclear weapons in warfare has held since 1945 — contrary to expectations

After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, few were so bold or foolish to predict this. Instead, there was widespread fear and dread after the bomb’s surprise unveiling that it would become an instrument for surprise military attacks, a decisive “war winning” weapon, and — the greatest fear — a civilization-ending weapon.

It hasn’t turned out that way — so far. The bomb could have been used by the Truman administration to end the Korean War, or by the Eisenhower administration either in Korea or in Indochina (to bail out France from its losing military campaign there), but it wasn’t. Mushroom clouds could have appeared by accidents, breakdowns in command and control, or during the Cuban missile crisis.

Despite close calls, we humans have been extremely fortunate. Sure, the concept of deterrence and the prospect of retaliation have induced caution, but deterrence is all about threats to use nuclear weapons — and threats generate more threats.

Diplomacy was essential to curtail dangerous military practices and, eventually, to achieve deep nuclear arms reductions, such as the 2011 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which still permits each side to retain 700 deployed missiles and subs.

Overall, US and Russian stockpiles are down around 85 percent from Cold War highs. Such nuclear excess makes it all the more remarkable that, for different reasons at different times, a seven-decade record of non-battlefield use has held. When it comes to the bomb, this taboo is the best thing we’ve got going for us.

2) Nuclear weapons are becoming too provocative to test

Russia hasn’t tested since 1990, the United States since 1992, China and France since 1996, India and Pakistan since 1998. The biggest outlier, North Korea, recently declared a closure of its test site.

During the Cold War, there was, on average, about one test per week somewhere in the world at test sites, in the atmosphere or at sea. Each test was a declaration of the bomb’s power and utility. Every test demonstrated faith and commitment to battlefield use in the event of a breakdown of deterrence.

The absence of nuclear testing conveys a very different message: that nuclear weapons aren’t like other instruments of war. They are different, a class apart. All of this is reversible, to be sure, but the longer the moratorium on nuclear testing continues, the greater the uproar should a nation violate the norm, and the greater the pressure on national leaders to abide by it.

3) Unfortunately, the nuclear taboo might be weakening

Few survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain, and memories of mushroom clouds and the close calls of the Cold War are becoming dim. Public opinion polling suggests that many Americans would not think twice if there were a great many casualties against evildoers. For example, a 2017 survey found that 60 percent of Americans would support a nuclear attack on Iran that would kill 20 million civilians, to prevent an invasion that might kill 20,000 American soldiers.

A new generation of deterrence strategists believes in the utility of low-yield nuclear weapons for small forays across the nuclear threshold. The Trump administration is working on two new options to add to existing choices, which include B-61 “dial-a-yield” bombs that could be less than one kiloton. (The weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 15 to 20 kilotons.)

The idea of limited nuclear options and low-yield weapons isn’t new, but wiser people have always been skeptical, questioning whether escalation can be controlled once the nuclear threshold has been crossed — especially since Moscow has never shown much interest in escalation control.

4) Traditional instruments of nuclear arms control are either weakened or have been set aside

Moscow is disregarding the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement and a 1989 agreement to prevent dangerous military practices on the ground or in the air. These executive agreements were designed to avoid provocative actions that could result in hull scrapes and aircraft collisions.

The George W. Bush administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, which had facilitated deep cuts in offensive arms. Moscow then withdrew from a treaty banning the placement of multiple warheads atop land-based missiles in 2002 and is proceeding to build new heavy missiles that can carry 10 or more warheads. Moscow has also violated a treaty prohibiting intermediate-range missiles, a move that ratchets up the perceived (and intended) threat to European members of NATO; the United States is taking steps to violate this treaty, as well, to counter Moscow’s leverage.

New START, which caps the longest-range instruments of nuclear war fighting — intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers — is set to expire in 2021 and may not be extended. In short, an era of superpower arms control that helped keep the Cold War from becoming hot is coming to a close.

5) International division about nuclear weapons is growing

A ban-the-bomb movement has picked up steam in states that have foresworn nuclear weapons, while strong pro-bomb constituencies exist in nuclear-armed nations. “Arms control” has lost its appeal to the American public, but arms races aren’t popular either.

New approaches to reduce nuclear dangers and weapons are not being advanced, even as treaties that have served us well are being cast aside or are unraveling.

So what’s the central organizing principle to prevent cataclysm for this era? Deterrence alone is insufficient and dangerous, while US diplomacy has been either erratic or absent. How can we proceed with friction on the rise with Moscow and Beijing, hyperpartisanship on Capitol Hill, and growing isolationist sentiment among Republican voters?

The bomb isn’t going to be banned anytime soon. So what’s our game plan? On this 73rd anniversary, we don’t have one.

Any sensible plan will protect positive developments since Hiroshima and curtail the downward slide we are in. The taboo against mushroom clouds in warfare is absolutely essential. Any crossing of the nuclear threshold could undo all the hard work of previous generations. The resumption of nuclear testing by major powers would be a devastating development; extending the moratorium against testing is crucial to devaluing nuclear weapons.

It’s also essential to affirm codes of responsible conduct when US and Russian or Chinese ships, aircraft, and troops are operating at close quarters, to prevent sparks that could lead to military confrontations. Many treaties have lapsed. Only New Start and its onsite inspections governing long-range missiles and bombers remains in force. At a minimum, it would be wise to extend it and further reduce their capacities for nuclear overkill.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki were targeted to end a world war that cost between 50 million and 80 million lives. If nuclear weapons are used again in warfare, the costs could be higher, because no one knows how such a conflict would end. This is the most important lesson to absorb on this 73rd anniversary of Hiroshima.

Michael Krepon is the co-founder of the Stimson Center, a nonpartisan policy research center working to protect people, preserve the planet, and promote security and prosperity.

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Trump has put the US on a path to bombing Iran

2018-05-09T11:59:09-04:00

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani talks about the nuclear deal at a press conference in Tehran in April 2015. President Trump has just undercut Rouhani. | Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images

The master of self-inflicted wounds has done it again. This time, President Donald Trump is walking away from meaningful, verifiable limits on Iran’s bomb program. The constraints on Iran’s nuclear program embedded in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action weren’t good enough for those in Washington, Israel, and Saudi Arabia inclined toward regime change and “kinetic” options — otherwise known as military strikes.

Now Tehran could become free to act without constraints and on its own timetable, without inspectors on the ground.

A president who mocked the deal that the Obama administration negotiated alongside the permanent members of the Security Council and the European Union will now be challenged to do better. Diplomacy isn’t Trump’s strong suit; trashing Barack Obama’s accomplishments is. Nullification of the Iran nuclear deal suits those with no faith in diplomacy, raising the prospect of harsher strategies, beginning with sanctions. If sanctions and diplomacy both fail, military options become more likely.

Trump’s stated rationales for walking away from the deal are weak. One reason, he said is that “it didn’t bring calm, it didn’t bring peace, and it never will.” But this wasn’t a peace treaty. It was a deal to verifiably block Tehran’s pathways to the bomb.

Why it’s misguided to link nuclear monitoring to other issues

With that comment, Trump was invoking the concept of “linkage” — conditioning a nuclear deal on improved behavior by an adversary outside the deal’s scope. That’s been tried before, most notably by the Nixon administration. Nixon wanted to rein in Soviet ambitions in the Third World. The Kremlin never signed up to linkage, and Nixon didn’t walk away from the arms control agreements that he and Henry Kissinger struck with the Soviet Union.

So why sacrifice verifiable and meaningful constraints on Iran’s nuclear activities because of Iran’s “malign behavior” — the White House’s words — in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere? A smarter strategy would be to push back against Iranian ambitions while maintaining verifiable constraints on Iranian nuclear activities. Why would Trump make this an either/or proposition?

Another ostensible rationale for pulling out of the Iranian nuclear deal is, according to the White House “fact sheet” on the decision, that it “did not include a strong enough mechanism for inspections and verification.” In fact, the Iran nuclear deal calls for 10-year, verifiable limits on Iranian research and development of enrichment technologies; 15-year verifiable constraints on enrichment; 20-year monitoring of centrifuge production, and permanent constraints on a plutonium pathway to bomb-making.

To be sure, every existing monitoring regime could be strengthened (especially if US diplomats were negotiating with themselves, as opposed to with the Iranians). But no nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, or reduction agreement to date has ever been this intrusive. It includes the presence of international inspection teams to supplement continuous monitoring by sensors at sensitive sites, reinforced by intelligence-gathering by satellites.

In response to the Trump administration’s withdrawal, Tehran could decide to curtail or remove foreign inspectors. So how will Trump’s walkout lead to tougher on-the-ground monitoring?

Iran’s past nuclear efforts aren’t a reason to drop the deal. They’re the reason for the deal.

Yet another argument Trump uses is that Iran negotiated in bad faith and on false premises. Specifically, Iran failed to come clean on its bomb-making activities prior to 2003 when, by the account of the US intelligence community, these activities ceased. Nothing that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented in his show-and-tell last week suggested that the efforts did not cease in 2003.

In any event, supporters of the Iran nuclear deal didn’t presume or argue that Iran had clean hands or that the regime’s blanket denials of bomb-related activities were credible. Instead, the deal’s backers wanted verifiable constraints on Iran’s nuclear program precisely because Tehran didn’t have clean hands.

Trump says he is ready to negotiate new terms whenever Tehran is willing — terms that have longer timelines for nuclear restraints and that address Iran’s ballistic missile programs along with its aggressive activities in the Middle East. Don’t hold your breath: The Iranians have signaled they have no interest in rewarding Trump’s walkout, but they might be willing to deal with European capitals if they are willing to part company with Washington on sanctions.

So what does this suggest for the future?

The White House says its goal is “to put Iran and its regional proxies on notice.” But on notice for what, exactly? The reimposition of tough US sanctions, and most likely additional new sanctions too, for a start. But no other party to the Iran nuclear deal is currently on board with Trump’s decision.

Even if France, Britain, Germany, and the EU bend — a crucial question, at present — their decisions will have little bearing on Moscow’s choices. Beijing will weigh its opportunities against possible sanctions that it is well poised to withstand.

If the Trump administration’s goal is regime change in Iran, that goal has become harder to achieve. Regime change happens primarily from within. But Trump’s move undercuts the deal’s chief supporter in Iran, President Hassan Rouhani, and his backers. Meanwhile, those who held strong misgivings about the deal and engagement with the United States will be further empowered.

If diplomacy and sanctions fail to achieve the Trump administration’s objectives, what then? In this context, the key passage of the White House’s fact sheet is the following: “Today’s action sends a critical message: The United States no longer makes empty threats.” A whiff of grapeshot wafts in the air.

What new threats are next? Imposing regime change based on the prospect of Iranian economic collapse? This seems fanciful even if Trump can bring everyone on board with tougher sanctions.

Responding in kind or in greater measure to Iran’s military tactics outside its borders now seems a given. Trump’s Memorandum to Cabinet Secretaries on his decision states that US policy will be “to disrupt, degrade, or deny the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and its surrogates access to the resources that sustain their destabilizing activities.”

Tellingly, this is the same phraseology used to characterize US military activities against al-Qaeda and “affiliated” outfits. When applied to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, this can mean an open-ended campaign involving far more direct US military involvement.

Greater pushback against Iran’s regional ambitions is, in my view, warranted. But sanctions backed up by a greater US military presence in the region won’t stop Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile activities. For this, military strikes would be needed — strikes that Netanyahu has long hoped for and would readily join in.

Opening this Pandora’s box would invite a host of unintended but predictable consequences. If diplomatic and economic coercion strategies fail, Trump has boxed himself into the binary choice of being judged to have engaged in hollow rhetoric or carrying out military strikes.

The reimposition of sanctions is unlikely to change Iranian behavior for the better. Walking away from the deal is more likely to result in worse Iranian behavior and a steady drumbeat for airstrikes.

Michael Krepon is the co-founder of the Stimson Center.